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Electricity cannot yet be stored on a large scale, but technological advances leading to cheaper and more
ecient industrial batteries make grid-level storage of electricity surpluses a natural choice. Because elec-
tricity prices can be negative, it is unclear how the presence of negative prices might aect the storage
policy structure known to be optimal when prices are only non-negative, or even how important it is to
consider negative prices when managing an industrial battery. For fast storage (a storage facility that can
both be fully emptied and lled up in one decision period), we show analytically that negative prices can
substantially alter the optimal storage policy structure, e.g., all else being equal, it can be optimal to empty
an almost empty storage facility and ll up an almost full one. For more typical slow grid-level electricity
storage, we numerically establish that ignoring negative prices could result in a considerable loss of value
when negative prices occur more than 5% of the time. Negative prices raise another possibility: rather than
storing surpluses, a merchant might buy negatively priced electricity surpluses and dispose of them, e.g.,
using load banks. We nd that the value of such disposal strategy is substantial, e.g., about 118 $/kW-year
when negative prices occur 10% of the time, but smaller than that of the storage strategy, e.g., about 391
$/kW-year using a typical battery. However, devices for disposal are much cheaper than those for storage.
Our results thus have ramications for merchants as well as policy makers.
Key words : inventory; electricity storage; electricity disposal; Markov decision process; asset pricing
models; negative prices
1. Introduction
In a commodity market, surpluses occur when supply outstrips demand. Because electricity supply
and demand must be matched in real time, dealing with electricity surpluses is particularly critical.
As storing surpluses for future resale is the most common strategy for commodities (Williams and
Wright 1991), it is also a natural one for electricity merchants who trade electricity in a market.
So, even though electricity storage has not yet been deployed on a large scale (only around 2.3% of
1
2electricity consumed in the U.S. currently is satised from storage; Gyuk et al. 2013, p. 4 and EIA
2012), several studies have recognized the potential of this strategy (EPRI 2004, Eyer and Corey
2010, The Economist 2012, Akhil et al. 2013).
In contrast to the prices of other commodities, electricity prices can be negative. Negative prices
have been observed in electricity markets both in the U.S. (Huntowski et al. 2012), including the
New York Independent System Operator (NYISO), PJM, the California ISO, and the Electric
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), and in other countries, such as the Nordic Power Exchange
(Sewalt and de Jong 2003), the European Energy Exchange (Genoese et al. 2010, Nicolosi 2010,
Brandstatt et al. 2011), and the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO 2009). In particular,
between 2008 and 2011 negative prices occurred in ERCOT around 10% of the time (Huntowski
et al. 2012).
Negative prices can be caused by a mix of factors: (i) technological limits on adjusting the
generation levels of coal or nuclear power plants, or the high costs of these adjustments, can lead
the managers of such plants to pay others to purchase their excess power when electricity demand
is low, e.g., at night (Sewalt and de Jong 2003, Knittel and Roberts 2005, Genoese et al. 2010,
Nicolosi 2010, Brandstatt et al. 2011, Brown 2012). (ii) Lack of transmission capacity can cause
excess local electricity supply, e.g., in ERCOT, where wind energy in the western zone cannot be
transmitted outside of this region (Brown 2012). (iii) The Production Tax Credit received by wind-
based electricity generators in the U.S., currently valued at 23 $/MWh (megawatt-hour) (DSIRE
2014), can induce wind generators to bid a negative price and still generate a positive revenue from
a sale (Fink et al. 2009, Brown 2012, Huntowski et al. 2012). (iv) Short-term supply gluts can arise
from policies that prioritize wind-based electricity generation, such as the one in Germany, which
disallow curtailing it except for reliability reasons (Genoese et al. 2010, Nicolosi 2010, Brandstatt
et al. 2011). It is widely believed that with the increasing use of wind power, negative prices will
likely become more frequent and larger in magnitude in the future (Genoese et al. 2010, Nicolosi
2010, Brandstatt et al. 2011).
It is unclear whether the presence of negative prices may alter the optimal threshold structure of
the nite-horizon merchant storage policy known to be optimal for the case when prices can only
be non-negative, or even how important it is to consider negative prices in such a storage policy.
We study these questions by modeling the problem of managing electricity storage with potentially
negative prices as a Markov decision process (MDP).
For the case of fast storage (the case when both lling up an empty storage facility and emp-
tying such a full facility take one decision period), we show analytically that negative prices can
3make the optimal storage policy structure signicantly dierent from those available in the litera-
ture (Charnes et al. 1966, Rempala 1994, Secomandi 2010) when prices are always non-negative.
Analogous to these known threshold structures, we show that for every stage and state, the initial
inventory set can be divided into three regions based on the type of optimal action: one region
in which it is optimal to empty the facility, one in which it is optimal to ll up the facility, and
one in which it is optimal to do nothing. But in contrast to these typical structures, our three
regions can be ordered in dierent sequences, and thus (i) the optimal next-stage inventory level
can fail to increase in the current-stage inventory level; i.e., a high current-stage inventory level
can result in a low next-stage inventory level (and vice versa); and (ii) the optimal action can bring
the current-stage inventory level farther away from a \target" band delineated by two thresholds
if this inventory level is outside of this band. Our optimal policy structure subsumes the optimal
policy structure of Charnes et al. (1966) for managing fast storage, i.e., when prices can only be
non-negative, our policy simplies to theirs.
For the case of slow storage|such as industrial batteries, which are more typical for grid-level
electricity storage applications (EPRI 2004, Eyer and Corey 2010, Akhil et al. 2013, Gyuk et al.
2013)|we numerically quantify the importance of considering negative prices using an existing
electricity price model calibrated to NYISO historical price data by Zhou et al. (2014). We nd
that ignoring negative prices when determining a storage policy could result in a considerable loss
of value when negative prices occur more than 5% of the time, as they already do in some markets,
e.g., ERCOT in 2008-2011 (Huntowski et al. 2012).
The presence of negative prices enables a merchant strategy dierent from storing electricity
surpluses in an ecient battery: a merchant might buy negatively priced electricity surpluses and
dispose of them, e.g., using specialized load banks, which are designed to mimic real load applied
to power sources and can be used to consume electricity for general purposes (Emerson 2014). As
Huntowski et al. (2012) point out, \negative prices could incent developers to build high electricity
consuming elements to use negative-price hours in wind-rich regions, for the sole purpose of being
paid to waste electricity." It is unclear how valuable this \wasteful" strategy is, or how its value
might compare with that of the storage strategy. Using the same calibrated price model as in our
analysis of the storage strategy, we demonstrate that when negative prices occur 10% of the time
the value of the disposal strategy is substantial|around 118 $/kW-year|but less than that of
the storage strategy, e.g., around 391 $/kW-year using a battery with a typical 80% round-trip
eciency (the ratio of electricity withdrawn to that injected; Eyer and Corey 2010). However,
because devices for disposing electricity (e.g., load banks) are much cheaper than ecient batteries
4(Emerson 2014, Coman Electrical Equipment Co 2014, Akhil et al. 2013), a merchant might nd
the disposal strategy more protable than the storage strategy. Our ndings also highlight for
policy makers the relative values of the storage and disposal strategies, suggesting the need for
additional research on assessing the potential impact of these strategies on social welfare.
We review the extant literature in x2. We model the storage strategy and derive the fast-storage
optimal policy structure in x3. We model the disposal strategy in x4. Our numerical analysis is
carried out in x5. We conclude in x6. Appendix A includes the proofs of the results presented in
x3.2.
2. Literature review
Our work is related to the commodity and energy storage literature. A classical problem studied in
this literature is the warehouse problem introduced by Cahn (1948): given a warehouse with limited
space, what is the optimal inventory trading policy under seasonal (deterministic) variability in
the commodity price? Dreyfus (1957) shows that if the commodity price is positive the optimal
inventory trading decisions for a given time and price are of the same type for every inventory
level: either ll up the warehouse, empty it, or do nothing. Charnes et al. (1966) extend this result
to stochastic, but still positive, prices. The warehouse in our paper is an electricity storage facility.
Rempala (1994) imposes a limit on the rate at which the inventory can be increased, and shows
the optimality of a threshold-type policy. Secomandi (2010) extends the model of Charnes et al.
(1966) to include both upward and downward inventory adjustment limits and establishes that
a double-threshold policy is optimal. Threshold-type policies continue to be optimal in Kaminski
et al. (2008) for a continuous time version of the problem, and Devalkar et al. (2011) for the case
of a commodity processor that faces procurement and processing capacity constraints and can
convert a single input commodity into multiple output commodities. Other related work can be
found in the commodity and energy real options literature (see, e.g., Smith and McCardle 1999,
Geman 2005, and Secomandi and Seppi 2014), including Chen and Forsyth (2007), Boogert and
de Jong (2008), Thompson et al. (2009), Lai et al. (2010a,b), and Wu et al. (2012). All of these
papers assume that the commodity price is positive. As discussed in x1, the optimal storage policy
structure that we establish for the fast storage case diers considerably from those of Charnes et al.
(1966), Rempala (1994), and Secomandi (2010).
Several electricity storage papers assume perfect information on future electricity prices, includ-
ing Graves et al. (1999), Figueiredo et al. (2006), Walawalkar et al. (2007), Sioshansi et al. (2009),
and Hittinger et al. (2012). This assumption yields a linear program, the optimal solution of which
5gives the optimal storage decisions for a given price path. In contrast, we model price as a stochas-
tic process, and derive the optimal fast storage policy. Two papers on electricity storage that also
model price uncertainty are Mokrian and Stephen (2006) and Xi et al. (2014): Mokrian and Stephen
(2006) assess the value of dierent electricity storage facilities in an electricity market; Xi et al.
(2014) co-optimize multiple usages of storage, including energy usage and backup service. However,
neither of these papers considers the case when prices can be negative, nor do they derive any
optimal policy structure.
Zhou et al. (2014) consider the possibility of negative electricity prices when jointly optimizing
wind-based electricity generation and storage. In contrast, we focus on examining the trading of
electricity surpluses using the storage and disposal strategies in the presence of negative prices.
3. Model for the storage strategy and its analysis
We model the storage strategy in x3.1. We analyze the optimal policy structure for the case of fast
storage in x3.2.
3.1. Model
We consider a merchant using a storage strategy to manage electricity surpluses in an electricity
wholesale market. Consistent with the literature, e.g., Walawalkar et al. (2007), Sioshansi et al.
(2009), and Hittinger et al. (2012), we do not consider bidding in a forward market. The merchant
trades electricity during a nite horizon in each period t2 T : = f1;    ; Tg; in the terminal period
T +1, any electricity left in the storage facility is worthless.
Let ~pt := (t; Jt) be a two-dimensional price-component vector, where ~pt 2 P  <2, t is a
mean-reverting component, and Jt is a spike component. The two price components evolve over
time according to exogenous and mutually independent stochastic processes. The electricity price
($/MWh) in period t given ~pt, is the known function Pt(~pt) : T  P ! <. We defer to x5.1 the
specic discussion of this price function and the price-component processes; their specications do
not aect our structural analysis in x3.2 as long as they satisfy the assumption that the merchant
is a price taker whose trading decisions do not aect market prices, which holds throughout our
paper.
We assume the merchant carries out the storage strategy with an industrial battery or a ywheel
(a device used to store rotational energy), two common types of electricity storage (EPRI 2004,
Akhil et al. 2013, Gyuk et al. 2013). However, our model can be easily modied to represent other
storage facilities, such as compressed-air energy storage and pumped-hydro storage (EPRI 2004,
The Economist 2012, Akhil et al. 2013). The merchant's storage facility is nite in energy capacity
6(\the maximum amount of energy that the system can deliver to the load without being recharged,"
Eyer and Corey, 2010); without loss of generality, we normalize the energy capacity to 1 (energy
unit). We let X be the set of feasible energy (inventory) levels in each period and dene this set
as the interval [0;1].
A fraction 1   of energy inventoried in the storage facility dissipates during one period (1  
is the self-discharging rate of the storage facility when on stand by; equivalently, , in (0,1], is the
storing eciency). We assume that this inventory loss occurs at the end of each period; this is
a reasonable assumption as the storing eciency is close to 1 for many types of storage facilities
(EPRI 2004), including all those listed above.
We denote as C (energy units/period) the maximum amount of energy that can be purchased
from or sold to the market in one period, due to battery-architecture or ow constraints. This
quantity is also referred to as the charging/discharging power capacity if one ignores the energy
lost when charging or discharging the storage facility. We let  and  (both in (0;1]) represent
the fraction of energy lost when charging and discharging the storage facility, respectively, that is,
the charging and discharging eciencies. The quantities  C and C= are thus the net charging
power capacity and the gross discharging power capacity, respectively, and are analogous to the
inventory adjustment capacity in the commodity storage literature. The round-trip eciency (the
ratio of the quantity of electricity withdrawn to that injected) is denoted as r and is the product
 .
For a given period length, dierent types of storage facilities can be modeled by varying the
value of the power capacity C. The case  C < 1 represents slow storage and the case  C  1
corresponds to fast storage. With a period length of ve minutes|the period length of the real-
time market in NYISO (NYISO 2011) used in our numerical study in x5|examples of slow storage
include industrial batteries, which usually take a few hours to fully charge/discharge (EPRI 2004,
Akhil et al. 2013); examples of fast storage include ywheels that can be charged/discharged fully
within minutes or even seconds (EPRI 2004, Akhil et al. 2013).
The action (decision) for each period t is denoted by at and represents the inventory change
between periods t and t+1 before accounting for the inventory loss: at < 0 is the inventory decrease
due to selling, so the quantity sold to the market is  at ; at  0 is the inventory increase due to
buying, so the quantity bought from the market is at=. The immediate payo function R(at; ~pt) :
<P !< from performing action at when the price-component vector is ~pt is dened as follows:
R(at; ~pt) :=
(
 Pt(~pt)  at ; if at < 0;
 Pt(~pt)  at=; if at  0:
(1)
7This denition relies on the assumption of a price taking merchant whose trading activity has no
eect on the market price.
We denote by xt the inventory (electricity, in energy units) in the merchant's storage facility
at the beginning of period t. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we consider values of
xt in set X , even though, due to the inventory loss, the inventory level at the start of periods 2
through T cannot exceed  before the action at is performed (but xt+ at can equal 1). We dene
the feasible action set for inventory level xt 2X as
	(xt) := fat 2< : at  xt; at  1 xt; at  C=;at   Cg ;
where the rst two constraints that dene this set stipulate that the inventory change cannot exceed
the available energy in the storage facility and the remaining space of this facility, respectively,
and the third and fourth constraints in this denition enforce the ow capacity limits.
In each period t2 T , the sequence of events is as follows:
(i) At the beginning of period t, the merchant observes the inventory level xt and the price-
component vector ~pt, decides the amount of electricity at= or    at to buy from or sell to the
market, and incurs the trading cash ow R(at; ~pt).
(ii) Electricity ows from the market to the storage facility in the case of buying or vice versa
in the case of selling and the charging or discharging loss (1 )at= or  (1  )at, respectively,
occurs: the inventory level xt changes to xt+ at.
(iii) At the end of period t, the inventory loss takes place, so that the inventory level at the start
of period t+1 equals (xt+ at).
We formulate the merchant's storage model as a nite-horizon MDP. Each stage of this MDP
corresponds to a time period in set T . The state variables in each stage t are xt and ~pt. Denote by
 the set of feasible policies and by At (xt; ~pt) the decision rule of feasible policy  in stage t and
state (xt; ~pt). The objective is to nd a feasible policy that maximizes the stage 1 market value of
the merchant's cash ows incurred during the nite horizon:
max
2
X
t2T
t 1E [R(At (xt ; ~pt); Pt(~pt))jx1; ~p1] ; (2)
where  2 (0;1] is the risk-free discount factor; E is expectation with respect to ~pt and xt , the latter
of which is the inventory level achieved in stage t by policy  (we use a risk-neutral probability
measure for ~pt, Seppi 2002, which then induces a joint distribution for x

t and ~pt); and x1 and ~p1
are the given initial (stage 1) inventory level and price-component vector.
8Let Vt(xt; ~pt) denote the value function in stage t 2 T and state (xt; ~pt) 2 X P. This function
satises the Bellman equation
Vt(xt; ~pt) = max
at2	(xt)
R(at; Pt(~pt))+ Et [Vt+1 ((xt+ at); ~pt+1)] ; (3)
where Et[] is shorthand notation for E[j~pt] and we dene VT+1(xT+1; ~pT+1) := 0 for all (xT+1; ~pt+1)2
X P. Solving the optimization on the right hand side of (3) yields an optimal action in stage t and
state (xt; ~pt). However, doing so is in general dicult, because for our continuous-state model the
continuation function Et [Vt+1 (; ~pt+1)] is dicult to characterize and compute exactly. Specically,
when storage is slow, in general this function is neither (quasi-) concave nor (quasi-) convex, and
even characterizing the structure of an optimal policy, let alone computing such policy, is dicult.
Thus, in our numerical investigation in x5, where we focus on slow storage, we numerically solve a
discrete-state version of model (3) by standard backward dynamic programming.
3.2. Structural analysis for the case of fast storage
In contrast to the diculty of characterizing the structure of an optimal slow-storage policy, in
x3.2.1 we are able to establish the optimal policy structure of model (2) for the fast storage case,
which we illustrate in x3.2.2 using examples. Despite its limitation to the fast storage case, our
analysis brings to light the impact of negative prices on the structure of the optimal storage policy
of Charnes et al. (1966), who also consider fast storage but only for prices that are non-negative.
It also allows us to further contrast the resulting structure against the optimal slow-storage policy
structures of Rempala (1994) and Secomandi (2010), who, like Charnes et al. (1966), also assume
non-negative prices.
3.2.1. Optimal policy structure We rst split the optimization in (3) into two optimiza-
tions: one allows only selling and the other allows only buying. We then nd the optimal solution
to each of these two optimizations. For the selling optimization, the optimal decision is to sell
to empty the storage facility for all the inventory levels below a threshold that depends on the
stage and price components, and to do nothing for all the inventory levels above it. For the buying
optimization, the optimal decision is to buy to ll up the storage facility for all the inventory levels
above a threshold that depends on the stage and price components, and to do nothing for all the
inventory levels below it. Finally, we combine the optimal solutions of these two optimizations to
derive the optimal solution for (3).
We dene by yt the inventory level at the end of period t, after both performing the feasible
action at given the inventory level at the start of period t, xt, and incurring the inventory loss:
9yt := (xt+at); yt thus belongs to the set [0; ] since at takes values in set 	(xt), which reduces to
[ xt;1 xt] when storage is fast. Substituting at  yt= xt into the objective function of (3) and
maximizing over yt 2 [0; ] rather than over at 2	(xt), we obtain
Vt(xt; ~pt) = max
yt2[0;]
R(yt= xt; ~pt)+ Et [Vt+1 (yt; ~pt+1)] : (4)
The function Vt(xt; ~pt) can be equivalently expressed as
Vt(xt; ~pt) =max

V St (xt; ~pt); V
B
t (xt; ~pt)
	
; (5)
where V St (xt; ~pt) and V
B
t (xt; ~pt) are the value functions attainable by optimally selling and buying,
respectively, in stage t and state (xt; ~pt):
V St (xt; ~pt) := max
yt2[0;xt]
 yt Pt(~pt) =+ Et [Vt+1 (yt; ~pt+1)]+xt Pt(~pt) ; (6)
V Bt (xt; ~pt) := max
yt2[xt;]
 yt Pt(~pt)=()+ Et [Vt+1 (yt; ~pt+1)]+xt Pt(~pt)=: (7)
We can solve the maximization in (3) by solving the two maximizations in (6) and (7) and picking
the best of their solutions. After removing their respective constant terms (given xt and ~pt), the
optimizations in (6) and (7) reduce to
max
yt2[0;xt]
 yt Pt(~pt) =+ Et [Vt+1 (yt; ~pt+1)] ; (8)
max
yt2[xt;]
 yt Pt(~pt)=()+ Et [Vt+1 (yt; ~pt+1)] : (9)
To avoid trivial cases, we make a standard assumption about the expected future electricity
price, which holds throughout this paper.
Assumption 1. For every t2 T n fTg, E[jP (~p )j j ~pt]<1 for all  2 T and  > t and ~pt 2P.
Lemma 1 states the convexity of the value functions of model (3) when storage is fast.
Lemma 1. For every t 2 T , for the fast storage case it holds that jVt(xt; ~pt)j<1 and Vt(xt; ~pt)
is convex in xt 2X given any ~pt 2P.
We denote the optimal solutions to (8) and (9) by ySt (xt; ~pt) and y
B
t (xt; ~pt), respectively (taking
them to be the smallest and largest optimal solutions to these optimizations when these models
admit multiple optimal solutions, respectively). Lemma 1 enables us to characterize the quantities
ySt (xt; ~pt) and y
B
t (xt; ~pt) in Lemma 2, which states that the optimal action for the selling optimiza-
tion (8) is either to sell to empty the storage facility or to do nothing, and the one for the buying
optimization (9) is either to buy to ll up the storage facility or to do nothing.
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Lemma 2. Given t 2 T , xt 2 X , and ~pt 2 P, the value of ySt (xt; ~pt) can be either 0 or xt and
the value taken by yBt (xt; ~pt) can be either xt or .
Lemma 2 suggests that the quantities ySt (xt; ~pt) and y
B
t (xt; ~pt) have a threshold structure in the
inventory xt given the stage t and price-component vector ~pt. Lemma 3 states the existence of
such structures with inventory threshold functions XSt (~pt) and X
B
t (~pt) of the stage t and the price-
component vector ~pt, and characterizes the value taken by these functions using the possible values
of ySt (1; ~pt) and y
B
t (0; ~pt), both of which, by Lemma 2, are 0 or . To facilitate our analysis, we
dene the objective functions of optimizations (8) and (9) as wSt (yt; ~pt) and w
B
t (yt; ~pt), respectively:
wSt (yt; ~pt) :=  yt Pt(~pt) =+ Et [Vt+1 (yt; ~pt+1)] ;
wBt (yt; ~pt) :=  yt Pt(~pt)=()+ Et [Vt+1 (yt; ~pt+1)] :
Lemma 3. For the fast storage case there exist inventory threshold functions XSt (~pt) and X
B
t (~pt) :
T P !X such that for every t2 T , xt 2X , and ~pt 2P it holds that
ySt (xt; ~pt) =
(
0; 8xt 2 [0;XSt (~pt)];
xt; 8xt 2 (XSt (~pt);1];
yBt (xt; ~pt) =
(
xt; 8xt 2 [0;XBt (~pt));
; 8xt 2 [XBt (~pt);1]:
The values taken by the functions XSt (~pt) and X
B
t (~pt) for t and ~pt depend on the two corresponding
possible values of ySt (1; ~pt) and y
B
t (0; ~pt), as follows:
XSt (~pt) =
(
1; if ySt (1; ~pt) = 0;
maxy= 2X such that wSt (yt; ~pt) =wSt (0; ~pt); if ySt (1; ~pt) = ;
(10)
XBt (~pt) =
(
0; if yBt (0; ~pt) = ;
miny= 2X such that wBt (yt; ~pt) =wBt (; ~pt); if yBt (0; ~pt) = 0:
(11)
Given a stage t and a price-component vector ~pt, Lemma 3 states that when restricting the type
of feasible actions to selling or doing nothing the value taken by the threshold function XSt (~pt)
splits the feasible inventory level X into two regions: a sell-to-empty region on its left, and a do-
nothing region on its right; likewise, when restricting the type of feasible actions to buying or doing
nothing, the value taken by the threshold function XBt (~pt) splits the feasible inventory level X
into two regions: a do-nothing region on its left, and a buy-to-ll-up region on its right. The value
taken by the function XSt (~pt) can be smaller than, equal to, or larger than the value taken by the
function XBt (~pt), as illustrated in x3.2.2.
The inventory threshold functions XSt (~pt) and X
B
t (~pt) are useful in characterizing the optimal
policy structure stated in Proposition 1, under the realistic assumption that the round-trip e-
ciency r is strictly less than 1, i.e.,  6= 1 or  6= 1. (We consider the case r= 1 in our discussion of
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this proposition below its statement, and further when discussing Example 1 in x3.2.2.) When the
value of XSt (~pt) is equal to or larger than the value of X
B
t (~pt), this structure can also depend on
one of the two additional inventory threshold functions Z
(1)
t (~pt) and Z
(2)
t (~pt), which we specify in
this proposition. We denote as at (xt; ~pt) the optimal action in stage t and state (xt; ~pt) for model
(3).
Proposition 1. Suppose that the round-trip eciency r is strictly less than 1 and storage is
fast. For every stage t 2 T and price component vector ~pt 2 P the feasible inventory set X can be
partitioned into no more than three regions where it is respectively optimal to sell to empty the
storage facility, buy to ll up the storage facility, and do nothing, as specied in Cases 1-3 below.
Case 1: 0XSt (~pt)<XBt (~pt) 1. It holds that
at (xt; ~pt) =
8><>:
 xt; 8xt 2 [0;XSt (~pt)];
0; 8xt 2 (XSt (~pt);XBt (~pt));
1 xt; 8xt 2 [XBt (~pt);1]:
Case 2: XSt (~pt) = 1 and X
B
t (~pt) = 0.
2(i) If V St (xt; ~pt) V Bt (xt; ~pt) for all xt 2X then
at (xt; ~pt) = xt; 8xt 2X ;
2(ii) if V St (xt; ~pt) V Bt (xt; ~pt) for all xt 2 X and V St (xt; ~pt)< V Bt (xt; ~pt) for at least one xt 2 X
then
at (xt; ~pt) = 1 xt; 8xt 2X ;
2(iii) otherwise there exists an inventory threshold function Z
(1)
t (~pt) dened on T P that returns
a value in the interior of the feasible inventory set X where V St (; ~pt) and V Bt (; ~pt) cross and
at (xt; ~pt) =
(
1 xt; 8xt 2 [0;Z(1)t (~pt)];
 xt; 8xt 2 (Z(1)t (~pt);1]:
Case 3: 0<XBt (~pt)XSt (~pt) 1 or 0XBt (~pt)XSt (~pt)< 1.
3(i) If XSt (~pt) = 1 and V
S
t (xt; ~pt) V Bt (xt; ~pt) for all xt 2X then
at (xt; ~pt) = xt; 8xt 2X ;
3(ii) if XBt (~pt) = 0 and V
S
t (xt; ~pt) V Bt (xt; ~pt) for all xt 2X then
at (xt; ~pt) = 1 xt; 8xt 2X ;
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Figure 1 Fast storage optimal policy structure for Cases 1, 2(iii), and 3(iii) in Proposition 1
3(iii) otherwise there exists an inventory threshold function Z
(2)
t (~pt) dened on T P that returns
a value in one of the sets 3(iiia): [XBt (~pt);1 =X
S
t (~pt)), or 3(iiib): (0 =X
B
t (~pt);X
S
t (~pt)], or 3(iiic):
[XBt (~pt) 6= 0;XSt (~pt) 6= 1] where V St (; ~pt) and V Bt (; ~pt) cross or meet and
at (xt; ~pt) =
(
 xt; 8xt 2 [0;Z(2)t (~pt)];
1 xt; 8xt 2 (Z(2)t (~pt);1]:
If Pt(~pt)< 0 then Cases 1 and 3(iii) are impossible. If Pt(~pt) = 0 then Cases 1, 2(ii), 2(iii), and
3(iii) are impossible. If Pt(~pt)> 0 then Case 2 is impossible.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 illustrates the optimal policy structure for Case 1 in Proposition 1: the
feasible inventory set X is partitioned into three ordered regions where it is respectively optimal
to sell to empty the storage facility, do nothing, and buy to ll up the storage facility. However,
some of these regions can be empty|for instance, it is possible that XSt (~pt) equals 0 and X
B
t (~pt)
equals 1, in which case the optimal decision is to do nothing for all feasible inventory levels, i.e.,
the entire feasible inventory set X is a do-nothing region and the other two regions are empty.
Panels (b) and (c) of Figure 1, respectively, illustrate the optimal policy structure for Cases 2(iii)
and 3(iii) in Proposition 1: the feasible inventory set X is partitioned into two ordered regions
where it is respectively optimal to buy to ll up the storage facility and sell to empty the storage
facility, with the former region preceding the latter region in Case 2(iii) and vice versa in Case 3(iii),
and these regions are separated by the value taken by the inventory threshold function Z
(1)
t (~pt) in
Case 2(iii) and the inventory threshold function Z
(2)
t (~pt) in Case 3(iii).
The fast storage optimal policy structure stated in Proposition 1 generalizes the optimal structure
established by Charnes et al. (1966) when storage is fast, the commodity price cannot be negative,
and the buying and selling prices are linear functions (through the origin) of the electricity price
in each stage. In this case the type of optimal action in a given stage and state is of the same type
13
 
Figure 2 Optimal policy structure of Charnes et al. (1966), when prices cannot be negative
for all the feasible inventory levels, i.e., either do nothing, buy to ll up the storage facility, or sell
to empty it, as illustrated in panels (a), (b), and (c), respectively, of Figure 2.
In the optimal policy structure of Charnes et al. (1966), for fast storage, and in the optimal
policy structures of Rempala (1994) and Secomandi (2010), for slow storage, the inventory level
that results from performing an optimal action is a non-decreasing function of the feasible inventory
level, which is not true in Case 2(iii) of the optimal policy structure stated in Proposition 1 (see
panel (b) of Figure 1). Moreover, the optimal policy structure given in Proposition 1 may bring
the feasible inventory level farther away from the interval [XSt (~pt);X
B
t (~pt)] in Case 1 (see panel
(a) of Figure 1). Specically, this situation occurs if the feasible inventory level falls outside of this
interval. The optimal policy structures of Rempala (1994) and Secomandi (2010) bring the feasible
inventory level as close as possible to an interval delineated by the values of two base-stock target
functions of the stage and price (components).
Mathematically, these dierences are due to the linearity in inventory of the value functions in
the model of Charnes et al. (1966) and the concavity of these functions in the models of Rempala
(1994) and Secomandi (2010), which contrast the convexity in inventory of the value functions of
model (3) when storage is fast. Negative prices and a round-trip eciency strictly less than 1 are
necessary for the strict convexity in inventory of these value functions: if prices cannot be negative
then the conditions that lead to the optimal policy structure of Charnes et al. (1966) are satised,
and these value functions are linear in inventory; if the round-trip eciency is equal to 1 then a
simple induction argument shows that these value functions are linear in inventory with slope equal
to the electricity price given a stage and price-component vector in this stage, and the optimal
policy structure of these authors emerges in this case as well (see the discussion following Example
1 in x3.2.2).
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Figure 3 The stage 1 value function and inventory level after performing the optimal action for Example 1
3.2.2. Examples Examples 1-3 illustrate how negative prices together with a round-trip e-
ciency strictly smaller than 1 give rise to the policy structures displayed in Figure 1. Specically,
Example 1 corresponds to panel (b) of Figure 1 (Case 2(iii) in Proposition 1), Example 2 to panel
(a) of Figure 1 (Case 1 in Proposition 1), and Example 3 to panel (c) of Figure 1 (Case 3(iii) in
Proposition 1).
Example 1 (Case 2(iii)). The time horizon consists of three periods (T = 3). The prices in
periods 1, 2, and 3, respectively, are deterministic and equal to  4,  3, and 0 (their units of
measurement are suppressed to ease the exposition both here and in the remainder of this section).
For simplicity, we assume no time discounting (= 1) and no loss in charging or storing (= = 1).
However, half of the electricity is lost in discharging ( = 0:5). The value function for period 3
is equal to 0, because the price in this period is 0. The negative price in period 2 and the zero
value function in period 3 imply that the optimal decision rule in period 2 is to buy to ll up the
storage facility at all inventory levels. Omitting the price-component vector argument throughout
this example (because the price evolves deterministically), the value function for period 2 is thus
equal to the buying value function in this period: V2(x2) = 3(1 x2). The value function for period
1 is
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V1(x1) = max

V S1 (x1); V
B
1 (x1)
	
= max

max
y12[0;x1]
2y1+3(1  y1)  2x1; max
y12[x1;1]
4y1+3(1  y1)  4x1

= maxf3  2x1;4  4x1g
= (4  4x1)  1fx1 2 [0;0:5]g+(3  2x1)  1fx1 2 [0:5;1]g;
where 1fg is the indicator function, which equals 1 if its argument is true, and 0 otherwise. The
value function V1() is the maximum of the linear functions V S1 () and V B1 (), and is thus convex,
as displayed in the left panel of Figure 3. Because yS1 (1) = 0 and y
B
1 (0) = 1, it follows from (10)
and (11) in Lemma 3 that XS1 = 1 and X
B
1 = 0, which corresponds to Case 2(iii) in Proposition 1
with Z
(1)
1 = 0:5, since the functions V
S
1 () and V B1 () cross once at 0.5. Hence, the optimal period 1
decision rule is to buy to ll up the storage facility when the storage facility is less than half full,
and sell to empty the storage facility otherwise. The right panel of Figure 3 illustrates the period
1 inventory level after performing the action corresponding to this decision rule, which exemplies
the structure in panel (b) of Figure 1. 
The intuition for Example 1 is as follows: since the price trajectory is  4,  3, and 0 in periods
1, 2, and 3, buying to ll up the storage facility in period 1 is always better than buying to ll it
up in period 2, and in period 2 selling to empty it is never optimal. The only issue is whether it
may be optimal to sell to empty the storage facility in period 1 and, once empty, to buy to ll it
up in period 2, rather than buying to ll it up in period 1 and, once full, doing nothing in period 2.
The payo of the rst policy is 3  2x1; the payo of the second policy is 4  4x1. The rst policy
is better than the second policy if and only if 3  2x1 > 4  4x1, i.e., x1 > 0:5, which means that in
period 1 it is optimal to sell to empty the storage facility when the inventory level exceeds 0.5, and
it is optimal to buy to ll it up when the inventory level is less than or equal to 0.5. This example
illustrates how an eciency loss (in this example 50% for discharging) combined with negative
prices can induce a nontrivial relationship between the inventory level and an optimal decision
rule; i.e., selling to empty the storage facility at high inventory levels (above 0.5) and buying to
ll it up at low inventory levels (at or below 0.5) in period 1.
Expressing the threshold functions in period 1 as depending on the period 1 price P1 rather than
the price-component vector in this period, which we do not model here, we can change this price
in Example 1 to obtain dierent values for the inventory threshold function Z
(1)
1 (P1) while keeping
the values of the inventory threshold functions XS1 (P1) and X
B
1 (P1) xed at 1 and 0, respectively.
For instance, if the period 1 price P1 varies in the interval ( 6; 3) then Z(1)1 (P1) is the function
2 + 6=P1, which strictly decreases on this interval, approaching 1 from below and 0 from above
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when P1 tends to  6 from above and to  3 from below, respectively; Z(1)1 ( 4) = 0:5 as shown in
Example 1.
As stated at the end of x3.2.1, negative prices and a round-trip eciency strictly less than 1
are necessary for the optimal policy structure in Proposition 1 to dier from the one of Charnes
et al. (1966). To illustrate, suppose that in Example 1 everything else is the same but there is no
discharging loss ( = 1). Then the optimal policy changes to buy to ll up the storage facility at
all inventory levels in both the rst and second periods, and to do nothing at all inventory levels
in the third period, which is consistent with the optimal policy structure of Charnes et al. (1966),
because the value function is linear in inventory in each period. (In particular, when the round-trip
eciency is equal to 1, it can be shown that it is optimal to sell to empty the storage facility when
the spot price in the current stage is more than or equal to the discounted expected next-stage
spot price divided by the storing eciency, and buy to ll up the storage facility otherwise.) On
the other hand, everything else being the same as in Example 1, if we increase the prices of all
the periods by 4, i.e., the price path is 0, 1, and 4 in periods 1 through 3, then the optimal policy
structure of Charnes et al. (1966) ensues, again, because the value function is linear in inventory
in each period: specically, the optimal policy changes to buy to ll up the storage facility at all
inventory levels in both the rst and second periods, and sell to empty the storage facility at all
inventory levels in the third period.
Example 2 (Case 1). This example has the same values for the charging, discharging, and
storing eciencies and the discount factor as Example 1, but it has four periods. The price in
the rst period is 4; the prices of the the last three periods are the following equally likely paths:
( 12; 10:8;0), ( 12; 7:2;0), and (54;0;0). Proceeding as in Example 1, we can analytically
determine|for each of the three price paths|the value function for period 2. Averaging these
value functions yields the continuation function for period 1, from which we obtain the period 1
optimal decision rule: sell to empty the storage facility at low inventory levels, i.e., those smaller
than 0.4, buy to ll it up at high inventory levels, i.e., those larger than 0.6, and do nothing for
moderate inventory levels, i.e., those between 0.4 and 0.6. The left panel of Figure 4 presents the
period 1 inventory level after performing the optimal action versus the feasible inventory level.
This chart illustrates the optimal policy structure in panel (a) of Figure 1 and corresponds to Case
1 in Proposition 1 with the values of the threshold functions XS1 and X
B
1 equal to 0.4 and 0.6,
respectively. 
Example 3 (Case 3(iii)). This example modies Example 2 by taking the period 1 price to be
3.2. The optimal decision rule in period 1 yields only two types of actions: sell to empty the storage
17
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Figure 4 The stage 1 inventory level after performing the optimal action for Example 2 (left panel) and Example
3 (right panel)
facility if the inventory level is below 1/8, and otherwise buy to ll it up. The right panel of Figure
4 plots the inventory level after performing the optimal action in period 1 as a function of the
feasible inventory level. This plot exemplies the optimal policy structure in panel (c) of Figure 1
and corresponds to Case 3(iii), more specically Case 3(iiic), in Proposition 1 with the values of the
threshold functions XS1 , X
B
1 , and Z
(2)
1 equal to 2/7, 1/11, and 1/8, respectively (1=11< 1=8< 2=7).
In Example 3 varying the price in period 1 yields dierent values for the inventory threshold
functions XS1 (P1), X
B
1 (P1), and Z
(2)
1 (P1), again expressed as functions of the period 1 price P1
rather than the, unmodeled here, period 1 price-component vector. For instance, if the period
1 price P1 changes in the interval (3;3:6] then we have X
S
1 (P1) = 0:8=(6   P1), XB1 (P1) = [(3  
P1)=(1 P1)] 1fP1 2 (3;3:5]g+[(3:4 P1)=(3 P1)] 1fP1 2 (3:5;3:6]g, and Z(2)1 (P1) = 2(P1 3)=P1.
These functions increase without crossing on the interval (3;3:6] for P1, coincide and are equal to
1/3 when P1 = 3:6, and X
S
1 (P1) tends to 0:8=3 and both X
B
1 (P1) and Z
(2)
1 (P1) tend to 0 (all from
above) when P1 approaches 3 from above.
4. Model for the disposal strategy
In this section we model the merchant disposal strategy for managing electricity surpluses in a
wholesale electricity market. Consistent with the storage strategy, the merchant does not bid in a
forward market and trades electricity in each period t from set T . The price evolution satises the
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same assumptions as in x3.1. The merchant carries out the disposal strategy using a device|e.g.,
a load bank|that in each period can consume an amount of electricity equal to C, which for
consistency we take to be the same as the gross charging power capacity of the storage facility.
Because the disposal strategy can either do nothing or buy up to C per period, the optimal disposal
strategy is trivial: buy C when the price is negative and do nothing otherwise. Therefore, the period
1 market value of this strategy is
X
t2T
t 1E [ Pt(~pt) C  1fPt(~pt)< 0g j~p1] : (12)
5. Numerical analysis
In this section we discuss our numerical results, which we obtain using the calibrated electricity
price model of Zhou et al. (2014). We present this price model in x5.1, introduce the setup of our
numerical analysis in x5.2, examine the values of the storage and disposal strategies in x5.3, and
investigate the importance of considering negative prices when devising a storage policy in x5.4.
5.1. Calibrated price model
We summarize the price model and the calibration results from Zhou et al. (2014). As discussed in
Zhou et al. (2014), and references therein, a model of electricity price evolution should capture four
salient features: negative prices; mean reversion, a tendency to revert back to the mean price level;
spikes, price jumps that quickly disappear; and seasonality, any repeated price pattern at any time
scale. To capture these features, Zhou et al. (2014) combine an inverse hyperbolic transformation
to accommodate negative prices as in Schneider (2011/12), a mean reverting model as in Lucia
and Schwartz (2002), a spike component (a jump that lasts for only one period) as in Seifert and
Uhrig-Homburg (2007), and a seasonality function similar to one of the functions in Lucia and
Schwartz (2002). Specically, the period t electricity price function Pt(t; Jt) is the sum of the
period t spike component Jt and the period t despiked-price function P
0
t (t), where t is the period
t mean-reverting component:
Pt(t; Jt) = Jt+P
0
t (t):
The spike component Jt is a compound Bernoulli process in which a spike occurs in period t with
probability  and with size distributed according to an empirical distribution. The despiked-price
function P 0t (t) satises
sinh 1

P 0t (t)
`

= t+ f(t);
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Table 1 Estimated parameters ^ and ^ of the AR(1) model and scale parameter ^` (Source: Zhou et al. 2014)
AR(1) model estimated parameters Estimated scale parameter
^ ^ ^`
0.1176 0.1770 30
Table 2 Estimated parameters ^0, ^1i's, ^2j 's, and ^3h's of the seasonality function f() (Source: Zhou et al.
2014)
^0 1.3778
i
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
^1i(10 3) 9 25.9 40.1 57  28.9 83.5 214.6 177.4 6.4  5.3  72.1
j
1 2 3 4 5 6
^2j(10 3)  40.2  97.6  5.6 14 20.9 33
h
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
^3h(10 3)  73.5  118.8  177.6  194  153.8  79.2 36.6 90.6 186.1 265.7 302.6 324.8
h
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
^3h(10 3) 320.7 317.1 302.7 295.5 310.1 356 337.7 339.9 313.1 243.7 145.7
where sinh 1() is the inverse hyperbolic function; ` is a scaling parameter; and f(t) is the season-
ality function for period t. Zhou et al. (2014) assume that t is an auto-regressive model of order
1, AR(1):
t = (1 )t 1+t;
where  is the mean-reverting rate;  is the volatility; and t  N(0;1) is an independent and
identically distributed normal error term. The mean level of this AR(1) process is 0 because the
mean of the despiked price process is captured by the seasonality component f(t), which is modeled
as follows:
f(t) = 0+
11X
i=1
1i D1it +
6X
j=1
2j D2jt +
23X
h=1
3h D3ht ;
where 0 is the constant level; 1i, 2j , and 3h represent the seasonality coecient of month
i 2 f1; : : : ;11g, week day j 2 f1; : : : ;6g, and hour h 2 f1; : : : ;23g, respectively; and D1it , D2jt , and
D3ht are dummy variables equal to 1 if period t is in month i, week day j, and hour h, respectively,
and 0 otherwise.
Zhou et al. (2014) calibrate this model to prices observed between 2005 and 2008 in the New
York City zone of the NYISO real-time market. The frequency of observations in this market is 5
minutes. We summarize in Tables 1-2 and in Figure 5 the calibration results of Zhou et al. (2014).
The resulting mean absolute error and root mean square error are 7.6349 $/MWh and 12.4023
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Figure 5 Empirical spike distribution; the estimated spike probability ^ is 0.0751 (Source: Zhou et al. 2014)
$/MWh, respectively, which correspond to 9% and 15% of the average observed price, 85.1206
$/MWh. The calibration error is thus relatively small. The frequency of negative prices estimated
on 10,000 Monte Carlo simulated price paths sampled from the calibrated price model is close to
that observed in the data: 0.44% in the simulation versus 0.45% in the data. Hence, this calibrated
price model is adequate for our analysis purposes.
5.2. Numerical setup
We consider various industrial batteries with the same energy capacity of 10 MWh and the same
power capacity of 1 MW (about 1% of the size of the NYISO New York City Zone real-time
market; NYISO, 2014), but with dierent values of the round-trip eciency parameter. This setting
corresponds to the slow storage case. We focus on slow storage rather than fast storage because
industrial batteries are currently more common in grid-level electricity storage applications than
fast storage devices (such as ywheels) due to their larger energy capacity and longer duration
of charge/discharge (Eyer and Corey 2010, Akhil et al. 2013). We use a period length equal to 5
minutes, which is consistent with the frequency of the observed prices used to calibrate the price
model (see x5.1). Thus, the value of the parameter C is the power capacity rescaled to a ve-minute
period: 1MW=(12 periods/hour) = 1=12 MWh/period.
The round-trip eciency of an industrial battery depends on its technology and specic design:
it varies between 0.4 and 0.5 for a metal air battery, 0.6 and 0.7 for a nickel-cadmium battery, 0.70
and 0.80 for a lead acid battery, 0.75 and 0.85 for a ow battery (such as zinc-bromine), 0.85 and
0.90 for a sodium-sulfur battery, and 0.9 and 0.95 for a lithium-ion battery (EPRI 2004, Eyer and
Corey 2010, ESA 2013).
To consider a wide range of battery technologies, we choose values of the round-trip eciency
parameter r in the set f0:5;0:6;0:7;0:8;0:9g. For all the values of r in this set, we experimented with
dierent possible feasible combinations of values for the charging eciency  and the discharging
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eciency  (recall that r=  ), and found that our results did not change substantially. We thus
report the results for the most common combination: equal charging and discharging eciencies
(EPRI 2004, Eyer and Corey 2010, Hittinger et al. 2012), i.e., =  =
p
r. We considered values
of the one-period storing eciency parameter  in the set f1;0:9999988;0:9999965;0:9999941g,
which are derived from the one-month self-discharge rates of 0% for a sodium sulfur battery,
1% for a lead acid battery, 3% for a nickel-cadmium battery, and 5% for a nickel-metal hydride
battery, respectively (EPRI 2004). Because of the low sensitivity of our ndings to the value of
this parameter, we report the results for the case of no self discharge (= 1).
We consider a one year horizon, so the total number of (ve-minute) periods in our MDP is
105,120 (= 12 24 365). We set the discount factor  for each period to 0.9999999, corresponding to
an annual risk-free interest rate of 1% with continuous compounding (recall that we use risk-neutral
valuation).
For each given set of parameters we solve a discretized version of model (3) by using backward
dynamic programming. As in Zhou et al. (2014), we use the method of Jaillet et al. (2004) to
discretize the AR(1) process as a trinomial lattice with ve-minute time increments that species
attainable price levels and their transition probabilities for each stage. This constructed lattice
converges in 6 stages to 11 levels. The spike process is, by denition, discrete. We discretize the
feasible inventory set into 121 equally spaced levels (we tried using more inventory levels, and
our results were unchanged), discretizing the feasible action space for each such inventory level
accordingly.
We take the value of the storage strategy to be the value function in the initial stage with zero
inventory level of the version of model (3) discretized as just discussed (the beginning of period
1 corresponds to 00:00 on January 1-st and we let ~p1 = (0;0)). We let the value of the disposal
strategy be the value of the version of expression (12) evaluated in a backward fashion again using
the discretized AR(1) process and the discrete spike process.
5.3. Comparison of the values of the storage and disposal strategies
We compare the value of the storage strategy at dierent round-trip eciencies and the value of the
disposal strategy. Figure 6 plots these values for dierent frequencies of negative prices, which we
achieve by introducing separate probabilities for positive and negative spikes, xing the probability
of a positive spike to the estimated spike probability, and varying the probability of a negative
spike based on this estimated value. (We obtained qualitatively similar results when generating
more frequent negative prices by increasing the absolute values of the negative calibrated values
of the hourly seasonality parameters ^3h's displayed in Table 2.) When negative prices occur more
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Figure 6 Impact of dierent frequencies of negative prices on the values of the disposal and storage strategies
frequently, the values of all the strategies increase; for each given frequency of negative prices, the
value of each considered storage strategy is always higher than the value of the disposal strategy.
Additionally, while the value of the disposal strategy is close to zero at a frequency of negative
prices equal to 0.5% (recall that 0.45% is the frequency of negative prices in the data used for
calibration), the value of this strategy becomes quite substantial at a 10% negative price frequency
(the frequency of negative prices in ERCOT in the past few years; Huntowski et al. 2012): about
$118,000 in our one year horizon given a power capacity of 1 MW (118,000 $/MW-year = 118
$/kW-year), but still less than the value of the storage strategy, e.g., about 391 $/kW-year when
the value of the round-trip eciency parameter r equals 0.8.
To better contrast the values of these strategies, Figure 7 breaks down both the value of the
storage strategy corresponding to a value of 0.8 for the round-trip eciency parameter r and the
value of the disposal strategy for dierent price intervals. Each bar represents the stage 1 estimated
market value of all the cash ows incurred during the entire horizon that are transacted at the
corresponding price interval. The value of the considered storage strategy arises both from selling
electricity at positive prices (most notably the [100 $/MWh, 200 $/MWh] interval) and from buying
electricity at negative prices|this storage strategy also buys at low positive prices, mostly in the
interval [0, 100 $/MWh]. By denition, the disposal strategy can only buy at negative prices. For
some (negative) price intervals, the value of the disposal strategy is slightly larger than that of the
storage strategy, because the battery cannot buy at negative prices when it is full|this dierence
is not perceivable in Figure 7.
Despite being less valuable than the storage strategy, the disposal strategy might be appealing
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Figure 7 Value generated at dierent price intervals by the storage strategy when the round-trip eciency
parameter r is set equal to 0.8 and by the disposal strategy when negative prices occur 10% of the
time
to merchants because devices for destroying electricity are much cheaper than those for storing
it. For instance, a load bank costs about 60 $/kW (Emerson 2014, Coman Electrical Equipment
Co 2014), but a battery with a round-trip eciency parameter r equal to 0.8 costs between 1,000
$/kW and 6,000 $/kW (Akhil et al. 2013). Therefore, at high frequencies of negative prices the
protability of the disposal strategy (the estimated market value of its cash ows minus the capital
cost) might be larger than that of the storage strategy. Merchants might thus be induced to invest
in load banks in markets where negative prices occur often, such as the Electric Reliability Council
of Texas (Huntowski et al. 2012) and the European Energy Exchange (Nicolosi 2010, Brandstatt
et al. 2011).
5.4. Relevance of modeling negative prices when determining a storage policy
To examine the relevance of modeling the possibility of negative prices when devising a storage
policy, we compare the values of the storage policies displayed in Figure 6 with their corresponding
values when we ignore the possibility of negative prices in the optimization in our discretized version
of model (3). Specically, to compute the latter values, we set any negative price to zero when
evaluating the payo function R(at;Pt(~pt)) in this optimization, obtain the resulting optimized
actions for every stage and state, and nally evaluate these actions under the original price model
that does admit negative prices.
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Figure 8 Percentage of the value of the storage strategy retained if negative prices are ignored when determining
a storage policy
Figure 8 plots the percentage of the value of the storage strategy captured by storage poli-
cies determined when ignoring negative prices. As expected, if negative prices occur infrequently
ignoring negative prices when determining a storage policy has little inuence on the value of the
storage strategy. However, if negative prices happen more than 5% of the time, neglecting negative
prices in devising a storage policy results in a substantial loss of value, e.g., a loss of 30% for a
battery with round-trip eciency equal to 0.8 when negative prices occur 10% of the time. This
loss ensues because this heuristic storage policy buys more than is optimal at low positive prices.
Consequently, the battery is full more often than is optimal when negative prices do occur, and
the ability to purchase at such attractive prices is thus lost.
Our results suggest that modeling negative prices when obtaining a storage policy is currently
relevant in some markets, and is likely to become more important as negative prices become more
frequent in practice.
6. Conclusions
Motivated by the empirical observation that electricity prices can be negative, we investigate how to
manage electricity surpluses from the perspective of a merchant. We model as an MDP the problem
of managing a storage facility in a wholesale market with prices that are potentially negative and
derive the optimal policy structure of this MDP for the fast storage case. We demonstrate that this
optimal policy structure generalizes a classic result of Charnes et al. (1966) and diers signicantly
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from typical threshold policies known to be optimal in the literature when prices are only non-
negative. In the slow storage case, using an extant price model calibrated to NYISO real-time
market data, we conclude that ignoring negative prices when devising a storage policy can incur a
signicant loss of value when negative prices occur more than 5% of the time. We also nd that the
value of the disposal strategy may be sizable, although smaller than that of the storage strategy.
For instance, when negative prices occur 10% of the time, the value of the disposal strategy is 118
$/kW-year compared to 391 $/kW-year for the storage strategy corresponding to a battery with a
80% round-trip eciency. However, as the capital costs of load banks are much cheaper than those
of batteries, investing in such disposal devices might be more attractive to merchants.
While the storage strategy is common in most commodity markets, the disposal strategy is
relatively rare. A type of disposal can be found in the practice of hydro spill: during rainy seasons,
excess water in a dam can be spilled to satisfy environmental or irrigation requirements (Ikura and
Gross 1984, BPA 2010, 2013). However, our analysis shows that there is potentially a hidden value
in this practice, as pumping and spilling water could be used as a method to destroy negatively-
priced electricity surpluses. As wind penetration increases and negative prices potentially become
more frequent, the disposal strategy may become more common.
In addition to providing guidance on the management of electricity surpluses at the rm level,
our results also raise awareness of potential issues at the societal level. Assuming that the disposal
strategy is less socially desirable than the storage strategy, our results have three policy implica-
tions. First, government policies may need to be enacted to promote the storage strategy, as our
results suggest that merchants may nd the disposal strategy more protable (i.e., once capital
costs are accounted for) than the storage strategy. Second, the Production Tax Credit (as men-
tioned in x1) may ultimately need to be modied (e.g., made hour-dependent or price-dependent) in
order to promote generating wind energy only when it is needed. Currently, this subsidy is constant
within a year (DSIRE 2014), and may thus promote generation of wind energy that is subsequently
destroyed. Third, curtailing wind energy may need to be used to mitigate the imbalance between
electricity supply and demand (Brandstatt et al. 2011, Wu and Kapuscinski 2013). At present,
operators in many regions curtail wind energy only for safety reasons (Genoese et al. 2010, Nicolosi
2010, Brandstatt et al. 2011), which may lead to negative prices and hence potential destruction
of green energy. However, the assumption that the disposal strategy is less socially desirable than
the storage strategy may not always hold. Sioshansi (2014), for example, identies conditions when
electricity storage reduces social welfare, and thus it may be possible that the disposal strategy,
or a mix of the storage and disposal strategies, is socially benecial at times. Investigating these
issues requires an equilibrium model, which is an opportunity for future research.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
We rst prove niteness. For each stage t, given any ~pt, it holds that
jVt(xt; ~pt)j  (1=)  jPt(~pt)j+
TX
=t+1
jEt[P (~p )]j  (1=)<1;
where the rst inequality holds because in each stage the quantity bought cannot exceed 1=, the quantity
sold cannot exceed 1, and 1 1=, and the second inequality is due to Assumption 1.
We prove convexity by induction considering the set T [fT +1g. The function VT+1(; ~pT+1) 0 is trivially
convex on X . We make the induction hypothesis that V (; ~p ) is convex on X for every stage  from stage t+1
through T . For stage t, Et[Vt+1(; ~pt+1)] is convex since expectation preserves the convexity of Vt+1(; ~pt+1),
which holds by the induction hypothesis. It follows that the objective function in (6) is convex in yt on [0; xt]
given ~pt. Thus, an optimal solution to the optimization in (6) can be either 0 or xt. By similar arguments,
an optimal solution to the optimization in (7) can be either xt or . Hence, we can limit the search for an
optimal solution to the optimization in (4) to the three candidate points 0; xt, and , which we include in
the set Yt. We denote the objective function for the optimization in (4) by vt(xt; yt; ~pt). We can thus write
Vt(xt; ~pt) = max
yt2Yt
vt(xt; yt; ~pt):
We next show that the function vt(; yt; ~pt) is convex on X for each of the possible values of yt in set Yt:
 If yt = 0 then it follows from (5) and (6) that vt(xt;0; ~pt) = Et [Vt+1 (0; ~pt+1)] + xt Pt(~pt)  , which is
linear, and hence, convex, in xt on X .
 If yt = xt then, by (5) and either one of (6) and (7), we have vt(xt; xt; ~pt) = Et [Vt+1 (xt; ~pt+1)], which
is easily shown to be convex in xt on X based on the induction hypothesis.
 If yt =  then (5) and (7) imply that vt(xt; ; ~pt) = Pt(~pt)=+ Et [Vt+1 (; ~pt+1)]+xt Pt(~pt)=, which
is linear, and hence convex, in xt on X .
By Proposition A-3 in Porteus (2002), the function Vt(; ~pt) is convex on X . It follows from the principle of
mathematical induction that Vt(; ~pt) is convex on X for all t2 T [fT +1g, and hence is convex on X when
restricting attention to t2 T . 
Proof of Lemma 2
It follows from Lemma 1 that both the objective functions for the optimizations in (8) and (9) are nite and
convex in yt given any t and ~pt. Therefore, a maximizer for each of these optimizations must be one of the
two end points of their corresponding feasible sets, i.e., ySt (xt; ~pt) is either 0 or xt and y
B
t (xt; ~pt) is either
xt or . 
Proof of Lemma 3
Fix t and ~pt. Consider the optimization in (8). According to Lemma 2, the value of y
S
t (xt; ~pt) can be either
0 or xt for each xt on X . The convexity of the function wSt (; ~pt) on [0; ], which follows from Lemma 1,
implies that there exists a critical inventory level (the largest one if there are multiple such levels) denoted
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Figure 9 The value of xS for the possible values of ySt (1; ~pt)
by xS such that ySt (xt; ~pt) = 0 for all xt in [0; x
S], and ySt (xt; ~pt) = xt for all xt in (x
S;1]. We can characterize
xS by considering the two possible values of ySt (1; ~pt), i.e., 0 and :
 Suppose that ySt (1; ~pt) = 0, which occurs when the function wSt (; ~pt) is either non-increasing on [0; ],
as in panel (a) of Figure 9, or non-monotonic on [0; ], as in panel (b) of Figure 9. In this case we have
ySt (xt; ~pt) = 0 for all xt in X , so that xS = 1.
 Suppose that ySt (1; ~pt) = , which occurs when the function wSt (; ~pt) is either non-decreasing on [0; ], as
in panel (c) of Figure 9, or non-monotonic on [0; ], as in panel (d) of Figure 9. In this case we have ySt (xt; ~pt) =
0 for all xt smaller than the maximum value of yt= such that w
S
t (yt; ~pt) = w
S
t (0; ~pt), and y
S
t (xt; ~pt) = xt
otherwise. Therefore, xS is this maximum value of yt=.
Consequently, we let XSt (~pt) be the function that returns x
S at the given t and ~pt.
Consider the optimization in (9). As stated in Lemma 2, the value of yBt (xt; ~pt) can be either xt or  for
each xt on X . By the convexity of the function wBt (; ~pt) on [0; ], there exists a critical inventory level (the
smallest one if there are multiple such levels) denoted by xB such that yBt (xt; ~pt) = xt for all xt in [0; x
B),
and yBt (xt; ~pt) =  for all xt in [x
B;1]. Considering the two possible values of yBt (0; ~pt), i.e., 0 and , allows
us to characterize xB:
 If yBt (0; ~pt) = 0 then we have yBt (xt; ~pt) = xt for all xt smaller than the minimum value of yt= such
that wBt (yt; ~pt) =w
B
t (; ~pt), and y
B
t (xt; ~pt) =  otherwise. Hence, x
B is this minimum value of yt=.
 If yBt (0; ~pt) =  then we have yBt (xt; ~pt) =  for all xt in X , so that xB = 0.
We thus let XBt (~pt) be the function that returns x
B at the given t and ~pt. 
Proof of Proposition 1
We x both t and ~pt throughout this proof.
Case 1: 0  XSt (~pt) < XBt (~pt)  1. We consider the following exhaustive and mutually exclusive cases
illustrated in panel (a) of Figure 10:
 For xt in [0;XSt (~pt)], according to Lemma 3 the optimal action for the optimization in (6) is to sell to
empty the storage facility, thus dominating the feasible do-nothing action for this optimization. Moreover, the
do-nothing action is optimal for the optimization in (7) by Lemma 3 and the assumption XSt (~pt)<X
B
t (~pt).
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Figure 10 Optimal solutions to the optimizations in (8) and (9) in dierent regions for Cases 1, 2, and 3 in
Proposition 1
It follows from (5) that the optimal action for the optimization in (4) is to sell to empty the storage facility,
i.e., at (xt; ~pt) = xt.
 For xt in [XBt (~pt);1], buying to ll up the storage facility is the optimal action for the optimization in
(7) by Lemma 3, and hence this action dominates the do-nothing action for this optimization. Furthermore,
Lemma 3 and the assumption XSt (~pt) < X
B
t (~pt) imply that the do-nothing action is optimal for the opti-
mization in (6). By (5), the optimal action for the optimization in (4) is to buy to ll up the storage facility,
i.e., at (xt; ~pt) = 1 xt.
 For xt in (XSt (~pt);XBt (~pt)), doing nothing is optimal for both the optimization in (6) and the optimization
in (7) according to Lemma 3. By (5), doing nothing is also the optimal action for the optimization in (4),
i.e., at (xt; ~pt) = 0.
Case 2: XSt (~pt) = 1 and X
B
t (~pt) = 0 (as illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 10). By the assumption X
S
t (~pt) = 1
and Lemma 3 we have wSt (0; ~pt)wSt (; ~pt), or, equivalently,
Et [Vt+1 (0; ~pt+1)] Pt(~pt) + Et [Vt+1 (; ~pt+1)] : (13)
Moreover, the assumption XBt (~pt) = 0 and Lemma 3 imply that w
B
t (0; ~pt)wBt (; ~pt), or, equivalently,
Et [Vt+1 (0; ~pt+1)] Pt(~pt)=+ Et [Vt+1 (; ~pt+1)] : (14)
Combining inequalities (13) and (14) yields
1

 

Pt(~pt) 0: (15)
Inequality (15) and the assumption r < 1, i.e.,  6= 1 or  6= 1, yield
Pt(~pt) 0: (16)
The assumption XSt (~pt) = 1 and Lemma 3 imply that y
S
t (xt; ~pt) = 0 for all xt in X , and it then follows
from (6) that V St (xt; ~pt) = Et [Vt+1 (0; ~pt+1)] + xt Pt(~pt)   for all xt in X , which is a linear function of xt
on X . By the assumption XBt (~pt) = 0 and Lemma 3, we have yBt (xt; ~pt) =  for all xt in X , so from (7) we
obtain V Bt (xt; ~pt) = Pt(~pt)=+ Et [Vt+1 (; ~pt+1)] + xt Pt(~pt)= for all xt in X , which is a linear function
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Figure 11 Cases 3(iiia)-3(iiic)
of xt on X . The linearity of the functions V St (; ~pt) and V Bt (; ~pt) on X implies that they can cross at most
once on the interior of X . If no such crossing occurs then there are two cases to consider:
2(i) If V St (xt; ~pt) V Bt (xt; ~pt) for all xt in X then at (~pt) = xt for all xt in X .
2(ii) If V St (xt; ~pt)  V Bt (xt; ~pt) for all xt in X and V St (xt; ~pt) < V Bt (xt; ~pt) for at least one xt in X , then
at (~pt) = 1 xt for all xt in X .
If the stated crossing occurs we have the following case:
2(iii) We let z(1) be the point on the interior of X where the functions V St (; ~pt) and V Bt (; ~pt) cross.
Inequality (16) and the fact that the stated crossing cannot occur when Pt(~pt) = 0, because in this case the
functions V St (; ~pt) and V Bt (; ~pt) are constant on X , imply that Pt(~pt) < 0. Thus, also by the assumption
r < 1, the slope of V St (; ~pt), which is  Pt(~pt), is strictly greater than the slope of V Bt (; ~pt), which is Pt(~pt)=.
Hence, we conclude that V St (xt; ~pt) < V
B
t (xt; ~pt) for all xt in [0; z
(1)) and V St (xt; ~pt) > V
B
t (xt; ~pt) for all xt
in (z(1);1]. In other words, we have at (xt; ~pt) = 1  xt for all xt in [0; z(1)), and at (xt; ~pt) = xt for all xt in
[z(1);1], where we arbitrarily break the tie between the optimal actions 1  xt and  xt at xt = z(1) in favor
of the action  xt. We let Z(1)t (~pt) be the function that takes the value z(1) at the given t and ~pt.
Case 3: 0 <XBt (~pt) XSt (~pt)  1 or 0 XBt XSt (~pt) < 1 (as illustrated in panel (c) of Figure 10). We
consider the following exhaustive and mutually exclusive cases for the potential values taken by the functions
XSt (~pt) and X
B
t (~pt).
 0<XBt (~pt) 1 =XSt (~pt). As in Case 2, if XSt (~pt) = 1 then V St (; ~pt) is linear on X . Lemma 3 implies
that V Bt (; ~pt) is linear on [XBt (~pt);1]. By Lemma 3 and the assumption XBt (~pt)XSt (~pt), it holds that on
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[0;XBt (~pt)) doing nothing is optimal for the optimization in (7) and suboptimal for the optimization in (6),
so that V Bt (; ~pt) V St (; ~pt) on [0;XBt (~pt)). Thus, the functions V Bt (; ~pt) and V St (; ~pt) can intersect (meet or
cross) at most once on [XBt (~pt);1]. If V
S
t (xt; ~pt) V Bt (xt; ~pt) for all xt in X then we have Case 3(i) for which,
given that XSt (~pt) = 1, a

t (xt; ~pt) = xt for all xt in X . Otherwise we have Case 3(iiia): the functions V Bt (; ~pt)
and V St (; ~pt) either cross on (XBt (~pt);1) or they coincide on [0;XBt (~pt)] and V Bt (; ~pt) is strictly larger than
V St (; ~pt) on (XBt (~pt);1]; the case when crossing occurs is illustrated in panel 3(iiia) of Figure 11, which also
relies on the equality V Bt (0; ~pt) = V
S
t (0; ~pt), as implied by Lemma 3 and the assumptions X
B
t (~pt) > 0 and
XSt (~pt) = 1. We provide the optimal action for Case 3(iiia), together with the optimal actions for Cases 3(iiib)
and 3(iiic), later in Case 3(iii) of this proof.
 XBt (~pt) = 0XSt (~pt)< 1. As in Case 2, the function V Bt (; ~pt) is linear on X . The function V St (; ~pt) is
linear on [0;XSt (~pt)] by Lemma 3. Lemma 3 and the assumption X
B
t (~pt)XSt (~pt) yield that on (XSt (~pt);1]
doing nothing is optimal for the optimization in (6) and suboptimal for the optimization in (7), and hence
V St (; ~pt) V Bt (; ~pt) on (XSt (~pt);1]. Thus, the functions V St (; ~pt) and V Bt (; ~pt) can intersect (meet or cross)
at most once on [0;XSt (~pt)]. If V
S
t (xt; ~pt)  V Bt (xt; ~pt) for all xt in X then we have Case 3(ii) for which,
because XBt (~pt) = 0, a

t (~pt) = 1  xt for all xt in X . Otherwise we have Case 3(iiib): the functions V St (; ~pt)
and V Bt (; ~pt) either cross on (0;XSt (~pt)) or they coincide on [XSt (~pt);1] and V Bt (; ~pt) is strictly smaller than
V St (; ~pt) on [0;XSt (~pt)); the case with crossing is illustrated in panel 3(iiib) of Figure 11, which also uses the
equality V St (1; ~pt) = V
B
t (1; ~pt), as implied by Lemma 3 and the assumptions X
B
t (~pt) = 0 and X
S
t (~pt)< 1.
 0 < XBt (~pt)  XSt (~pt) < 1. This is Case 3(iiic). As in Case 3(iiia), the function V Bt (; ~pt) is linear on
[XBt (~pt);1] and we have V
B
t (; ~pt)  V St (; ~pt) on [0;XBt (~pt)). As in Case 3(iiib), the function V St (; ~pt) is
linear on [0;XSt (~pt)] and it holds that V
S
t (; ~pt) V Bt (; ~pt) on (XSt (~pt);1]. Thus, the functions V St (; ~pt) and
V Bt (; ~pt) can cross at most once on [XBt (~pt);XSt (~pt)]. The case when the functions V St (; ~pt) and V Bt (; ~pt)
cross on [XBt (~pt);X
S
t (~pt)] is illustrated in panel 3(iiic) of Figure 11, which is also based on the equalities
V St (0; ~pt) = V
B
t (0; ~pt) and V
S
t (1; ~pt) = V
B
t (1; ~pt), as implied by Lemma 3 and the assumptions X
B
t (~pt) 6= 0 and
XSt (~pt) 6= 1. If the functions V St (; ~pt) and V Bt (; ~pt) do not cross on [XBt (~pt);XSt (~pt)], then they must coincide
on X . Moreover, we must have XBt (~pt) = XSt (~pt): if Pt(~pt) 6= 0 and XBt (~pt) 6= XSt (~pt) then the respective
slopes of the linear functions V St (; ~pt) and V Bt (; ~pt) on [XBt (~pt);XSt (~pt)] are Pt(~pt) and Pt(~pt)=, which
cannot be equal if r < 1, as assumed; if Pt(~pt) = 0 it is shown later in this proof that this case cannot subsist.
Hence, the functions V St (; ~pt) and V Bt (; ~pt) meet at XBt (~pt) =XSt (~pt).
We group Cases 3(iiia), 3(iiib), and 3(iiic) into Case 3(iii): we let z(2) be the point in [XBt (~pt);X
S
t (~pt)]\
(0;1), more specically, [XBt (~pt);1 = X
S
t (~pt)) for 3(iiia), (0 = X
B
t (~pt);X
S
t (~pt)] for 3(iiib), and [X
B
t (~pt) 6=
0;XSt (~pt) 6= 1] for 3(iiic), where the functions V St (; ~pt) and V Bt (; ~pt) intersect and Z(2)t (~pt) be the function
that evaluates to z(2) at the given t and ~pt. Arbitrarily breaking the tie between the optimal actions  xt
and 1 xt at xt = z(2) in favor of the action  xt, we thus have
at (xt; ~pt) =
(
 xt; 8xt 2 [0;Z(2)t (~pt)];
1 xt; 8xt 2 (Z(2)t (~pt);1]:
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Impossibility of cases: Pt(~pt)< 0.
Case 1. By Lemma 2, the only two possible values for yBt (0; ~pt) are 0 and . If y
B
t (0; ~pt) = 0 we have
ySt (1; ~pt) = 0 because
wSt (0; ~pt) = w
B
t (0; ~pt)
> wBt (; ~pt)
=  Pt(~pt)

+ E[Vt+1(; ~pt+1)]
>  Pt(~pt) + E[Vt+1(; ~pt+1)]
= wSt (; ~pt);
where the rst inequality is due to our convention that yBt (; ~pt) is the largest maximizer for the optimization
in (9) and the premise yBt (0; ~pt) = 0, and the second inequality to the assumption Pt(~pt)< 0. Lemma 3 thus
implies that XSt (~pt) = 1, and Case 1 is impossible. If y
B
t (0; ~pt) =  if follows from Lemma 3 that X
B
t (~pt) = 0,
and Case 1 cannot occur.
Case 3(iii). The slope of the linear function V St (; ~pt) on [0;XSt (~pt)] is Pt(~pt) and the slope of the linear
function V Bt (; ~pt) on [XBt (~pt);1] is Pt(~pt)=. The assumptions Pt(~pt)< 0 and r < 1 yield
Pt(~pt)>
Pt(~pt)

: (17)
Case 3(iiic) when the functions V St (; ~pt) and V Bt (; ~pt) meet at XBt (~pt) =XSt (~pt) is impossible because other-
wise it would follow from inequality (17) that the function Vt(; ~pt) is strictly concave on X , which contradicts
its convexity established in Lemma 1. By construction, Case 3(iiia), Case 3(iiib), and Case 3(iiic) with
the qualication that the functions V St (; ~pt) and V Bt (; ~pt) cross on [XBt (~pt);XSt (~pt] cannot subsist when
inequality (17) holds: for Case 3(iiia), given that V Bt (; ~pt) V St (; ~pt) on [0;XBt (~pt)] it follows from inequal-
ity (17) that V Bt (; ~pt) and V St (; ~pt) cannot intersect on [XBt (~pt);1 = XSt (~pt)); for Case 3(iiib), we have
V Bt (; ~pt) V St (; ~pt) on [XSt (~pt);1] and inequality (17) implies that V Bt (; ~pt) and V St (; ~pt) cannot intersect on
(0 =XBt (~pt);X
S
t (~pt)]; for Case 3(iiic) with the stated qualication, by a similar logic V
B
t (; ~pt) and V St (; ~pt)
cannot cross on [XBt (~pt);X
S
t (~pt)] if inequality (17) is true.
Impossibility of cases: Pt(~pt) = 0. If Pt(~pt) = 0 and Et [Vt+1 (; ~pt+1)] is constant on [0; ] then Case 2(i)
occurs, and hence all the other cases are impossible, because our convention that yBt (; ~pt) is the largest
maximizer for the optimization in (9) and ySt (; ~pt) is the smallest maximizer for the optimization in (8)
yields ySt (1; ~pt) = 0 and y
B
t (0; ~pt) = , and then Lemma 3 implies X
S
t (~pt) = 1 and X
B
t (~pt) = 0, and V
S
t (; ~pt)
and V Bt (; ~pt) are both equal to the same constant on X .
Suppose that Pt(~pt) = 0, Et [Vt+1 (; ~pt+1)] is not constant on [0; ], and Et [Vt+1 (0; ~pt+1)] =
Et [Vt+1 (; ~pt+1)]. Then by our convention that ySt (; ~pt) is the smallest maximizer for the optimization in
(8) and yBt (; ~pt) is the largest maximizer for the optimization in (9) we have yBt (0; ~pt) =  and ySt (1; ~pt) = 0,
and it follows from Lemma 3 that XSt (~pt) = 1 and X
B
t (~pt) = 0, as well as V
S
t (; ~pt) = Et [Vt+1 (0; ~pt+1)] =
Et [Vt+1 (; ~pt+1)] = V Bt (; ~pt) on X , which corresponds to Case 2(i), and thus all the other cases are impos-
sible.
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If Pt(~pt) = 0, E[Vt+1(; ~pt+1)] is not constant on [0; ], and E[Vt+1(0; ~pt+1)]>E[Vt+1(; ~pt+1)] then ySt (1; ~pt) =
yBt (0; ~pt) = 0 and Lemma 3 thus implies that X
S
t (~pt) = 1 and X
B
t (~pt) 6= 0, which corresponds to Case 3(i) or
Case 3(iiia), and hence all the other cases are impossible. By Lemma 3 we have V St (; ~pt) = E[Vt+1(0; ~pt+1)]
on X and V Bt (; ~pt) = E[Vt+1(; ~pt+1)] < E[Vt+1(0; ~pt+1)] = V St (; ~pt) on [XBt (~pt);1]. As shown in the con-
struction of Cases 3(i) and 3(iiia), we have V Bt (; ~pt) V St (; ~pt) on [0;XBt (~pt)). We thus conclude that Case
3(i) occurs and Case 3(iiia) is also impossible.
If Pt(~pt) = 0, E[Vt+1(; ~pt+1)] is not constant on [0; ], and E[Vt+1(0; ~pt+1)] < E[Vt+1(; ~pt+1)] it follows
from Lemma 3 that XSt (~pt) 6= 1 and XBt (~pt) = 0, which conforms with Case 3(ii) or Case 3(iiib), and con-
sequently all the other cases are impossible. Lemma 3 implies that V Bt (; ~pt) = E[Vt+1(; ~pt+1)] on X and
V St (; ~pt) = E[Vt+1(0; ~pt+1)]< E[Vt+1(; ~pt+1)] = V Bt (; ~pt) on [0;XSt (~pt)]. In the construction of Cases 3(ii)
and 3(iiib) we showed that V St (; ~pt) V Bt (; ~pt) on (XSt (~pt);1]. Hence, Case 3(ii) occurs and Case 3(iiib) is
also impossible.
Impossibility of cases: Pt(~pt)> 0. If Pt(~pt)> 0 then Case 2 is impossible because inequality (16) is necessary
for the existence of this case. 
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